The
Extent of Criminalisation in Politics
Despite the best
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution and the Members of Parliament at
the onset of the Indian Republic, the fear of a nexus between crime and
politics was widely expressed from the first general election itself in 1952.
In fact, as far back as in 1922, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari had anticipated the
present state of affairs twenty five years before Independence, when he wrote
in his prison diary: “Elections and their corruption, injustice and tyranny
of wealth, and inefficiency of administration, will make a hell of life as soon
as freedom is given to us…”
Interestingly,
observers have noted that the nature of this nexus changed in the 1970s.
Instead of politicians having suspected links to criminal networks, as was the
case earlier, it was persons with extensive criminal backgrounds who began
entering politics.
This was confirmed in the Vohra Committee Report in 1993, and again in 2002 in
the report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution
(NCRWC). The Vohra Committee report pointed to the rapid growth of criminal
networks that had in turn developed an elaborate system of contact with
bureaucrats, politicians and media persons. A Consultation Paper
published by the NCRWC in 2002 went further to say that criminals were now
seeking direct access to power by becoming legislators and ministers
themselves.
Since the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, which made the analysis of
criminal records of candidates possible by requiring such records to be
disclosed by way of affidavit, the public has had a chance to quantitatively
assess the validity of such observations made in the previous reports. The
result of such analysis leads to considerable concern.
In the ten years since
2004, 18% of candidates contesting either National or State elections have
criminal cases pending against them (11,063 out of 62,847). In 5,253 or almost
half of these cases (8.4% of the total candidates analysed), the charges are of
serious criminal offences that include murder, attempt to murder, rape, crimes
against women, cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, or under the
Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 which on conviction would
result in five years or more of jail, etc. 152 candidates had 10 or more
serious cases pending, 14 candidates had 40 or more such cases and 5 candidates
had 50 or more cases against them.
The 5,253 candidates
with serious cases together had 13,984 serious charges against them. Of these
charges, 31% were cases of murder and other murder related offences, 4% were
cases of rape and offences against women, 7% related to kidnapping and
abduction, 7% related to robbery and dacoity, 14% related to forgery and
counterfeiting including of government seals and 5% related to breaking the law
during elections.
Criminal backgrounds
are not limited to contesting candidates, but are found among winners as well.
Of these 5,253 candidates with serious criminal charges against them, 1,187
went on to winning the elections they contested i.e. 13.5% of the 8,882 winners
analysed from 2004 to 2013. Overall, including both serious and non-serious
charges, 2,497 (28.4% of the winners) had 9,993 pending criminal cases against
them.
In the current Lok Sabha,
30% or 162 sitting MPs have criminal cases pending against them, of which about
half i.e. 76 have serious criminal cases. Further, the prevalence of MPs with
criminal cases pending has increased over time. In 2004, 24% of Lok Sabha MPs
had criminal cases pending, which increased to 30% in the 2009 elections.
The situation is
similar across states with 31% or 1,258 out of 4,032 sitting MLAs with pending
cases, with again about half being serious cases. Some states have a much
higher percentage of MLAs with criminal records: in Uttar Pradesh, 47% of MLAs
have criminal cases pending. A number of MPs and MLAs
have been accused of multiple counts of criminal charges. In a constituency of
Uttar Pradesh, for example, the MLA has 36 criminal cases pending including 14
cases related to murder.
From
this data it is clear that about one-third of elected candidates at the
Parliament and State Assembly levels in India have some form of criminal taint.
Data elsewhere suggests that one-fifth of MLAs have pending cases which have
proceeded to the stage of charges being framed against them by a court at the
time of their election.
Even more disturbing is the finding that the percentage of winners with
criminal cases pending is higher than the percentage of candidates without such
backgrounds. While only 12% of candidates with a “clean” record win on average,
23% of candidates with some kind of criminal record win. This means that
candidates charged with a crime actually fare better at elections than ‘clean’
candidates. Probably as a result, candidates with criminal cases against them
tend to be given tickets a second time.18
Not only do political parties select candidates with criminal backgrounds,
there is evidence to suggest that untainted representatives later become
involved in criminal activities.The
incidence of criminalisation of politics is thus pervasive making its
remediation an urgent need.
Existing Legal
Framework
Legally, the prevention
of the entry of criminals into politics is accomplished by prescribing certain
disqualifications that will prevent a person from contesting elections or
occupying a seat in Parliament or an Assembly. Qualifications of members of
Parliament are listed in Article 84 of the Constitution, while
disqualifications can be found under Article 102. Corresponding provisions for
members of State Legislative Assemblies are found in Articles 173 and 191.
Article 102 states that
a person shall be disqualified from being chosen, and from being a member of
either House of Parliament if he holds an office of profit, if he is of unsound
mind and so declared by a competent court, if he is an undischarged insolvent,
if he is not a citizen of India and if he is disqualified by any other law made
by Parliament.
Parliament through the
RPA has prescribed further qualifications and disqualifications for membership
to Parliament or to a Legislative Assembly. Section 8 of the Act lists certain
offences which, if a person is convicted of any of them, disqualifies him from
being elected, or continuing as, a Member of Parliament or Legislative
Assembly. Specifically, Section 8(1) lists a number of offences, convictions
under which disqualify the candidate irrespective of the quantum of sentence or
fine – these include certain electoral offences, offences under the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985 the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 etc. Section 8(2) lists other
offences, convictions under which would only result in disqualification if imprisonment
is for six months or more. Section 8(3) is a residuary provision under which if
a candidate is convicted of any offence and imprisoned for two years or more,
he is disqualified. Disqualification operates
from the date of conviction and continues for a further period of six years
from the date of release.
The scheme of
disqualification upon conviction laid down by the RPA clearly upholds the
principle that a person who has conducted criminal activities of a certain
nature is unfit to be a representative of the people. The criminal activities
that result in disqualification irrespective of punishment under S. 8(1) are
either related to public office, such as electoral offences or insulting the
national flag, or are of grave nature, such as offences under terrorism laws.
S. 8(3), on the other hand, envisages that any offence for which the minimum
punishment is two years is of a character serious enough to merit
disqualification. In either case, it is clear that the RPA lays down that the
commission of serious criminal offences renders a person ineligible to stand
for elections or continue as a representative of the people. Such a
restriction, it was envisaged, would provide the statutory deterrent necessary
to prevent criminal elements from holding public office, thereby preserving the
probity of representative government.
However, it is clear
from the above account of the spread of criminalisation in politics that the
purpose behind S. 8 of the RPA is not being served. The consequences of such
criminalisation and the possible reform measures that may be considered shall
be discussed in the following chapters.
With respect to the
filing of affidavits by candidates, a candidate to any National or State
Assembly elections is required to furnish an affidavit, in the shape of Form 26
appended to the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, containing information
regarding their assets, liabilities, educational qualifications, criminal
convictions against them that have not resulted in disqualification, and cases
in which criminal charges are framed against them for any offence punishable
with two years or more.
Failure to furnish this
information, concealment of information or giving of false information is an
offence under S. 125A of the RPA. However, the sentence under S. 125A is only
imprisonment for a period of 6 months, and the offence is not listed under S.
8(1) or (2) of the RPA. Therefore, conviction under S. 125A does not result in
disqualification of the candidate. Neither is the offence of false disclosure
listed as a corrupt practice which would be a ground for setting aside an
election under Section 100.
Therefore,
there is currently little consequence for the offence of filing a false
affidavit, as a result of which the practice is rampant.
Supreme Court Judgments
interpreting this Framework
The judiciary has
sought to curb this menace of criminalisation of politics through several
seminal judgments and attendant directions to the government and the Election
Commission primarily based on the aforesaid provisions. Specifically, orders of
the Supreme Court seeking to engender a cleaner polity can be classified into
three types: first, decisions that introduce transparency into the
electoral process; second, those that foster greater accountability for
holders of public office; third, judgments that seek to stamp out
corruption in public life. The discussion below is not meant to be an
exhaustive account; it merely illustrates the trends in Supreme Court
jurisprudence relating to the question of de-criminalisation of politics.
In Union of India v.
Association for Democratic Reforms(hereinafter
‘ADR’) the Supreme Court directed the Election Commission to call for
certain information on affidavit of each candidate contesting for Parliamentary
or State elections. Particularly relevant to the question of criminalisation,
it mandated that such information includes whether the candidate is
convicted/acquitted/discharged of any criminal offence in the past, and if
convicted, the quantum of punishment; and whether prior to six months of filing
of nomination, the candidate is accused in any pending case, of any offence
punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and in which charge is
framed or cognizance is taken by a court. The constitutional justification for
such a direction was the fundamental right of electors to know the antecedents
of the candidates who are contesting for public office. Such right to know, the
Court held is a salient facet, and the foundation for the meaningful exercise
of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to all citizens under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Again
in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India(hereinafter
‘PUCL’) the Supreme Court struck down Section 33B of the Representation
of People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 which sought to limit the ambit of
operation of the earlier Supreme Court order in the ADR case.
Specifically it provided that only the information that was required to be
disclosed under the Amendment Act would have to be furnished by candidates and
not pursuant to any other order or direction. This meant, in practical terms,
that the assets and liabilities, educational qualifications and the cases in
which he is acquitted or discharged of criminal offences would not have to be
disclosed. Striking this down, the Court held that the provision nullified the
previous order of the Court, infringed the right of electors’ to know, a
constituent of the fundamental right to free speech and expression and hindered
free and fair elections which is part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. It is pursuant to these two orders that criminal antecedents of
all candidates in elections are a matter of public record, allowing voters to
make an informed choice.
At the same time, the
Supreme Court has also sought to foster greater accountability for those
holding elected office. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India
the Court held that Section 8(4) of the RPA, which allows MPs and MLAs who
are convicted while serving as members to continue in office till an appeal
against such conviction is disposed of, is unconstitutional. Two justifications
were offered — first, Parliament does not have the competence to provide
different grounds for disqualification of applicants for membership and sitting
members; second, deferring the date from which disqualification commences is
unconstitutional in light of Articles 101(3) and 190(3) of our Constitution,
which mandate that the seat of a member will become vacant automatically on
disqualification.
Again in People’s
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India(hereinafter
‘NOTA’), the court held that the provisions of the Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961, which require mandatory disclosure of a person’s identity in case
he intends to register a no-vote, is unconstitutional for being violative of
his freedom of expression, which includes his right to freely choose a
candidate or reject all candidates, arbitrary given that no analogous
requirement of disclosure exists when a positive vote is registered, and
illegal given its patent violation of the need for secrecy in elections provided
in the RPA and widely recognised as crucial for free and fair elections. Thus
by allowing voters to express their dissatisfaction with candidates from their
constituency for any reason whatsoever, the Supreme Court order has a
significant impact in fostering greater accountability for incumbent
office-holders. When its impact is combined with the decision in Lily
Thomas, it is clear that the net effect of these judgments is to make it
more onerous for criminal elements entrenched in Parliament from continuing in
their positions.
Third, the Supreme Court has
taken several steps for institutional reform to sever the connection between
crime and politics. In VineetNarain v. Union of India
a case concerning the inertia of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
in investigating matters arising out of certain seized documents known as the
‘Jain diaries’ which disclosed a nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and
criminals, who were recipients of money from unlawful sources, the Supreme
Court used the power of continuing mandamus to direct large-scale
institutional reform in the vigilance and investigation apparatus in the
country. It directed the Government of India to grant statutory status to the
Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), laid down the conditions necessary for the
independent functioning of the CBI, specified a selection process for the
Director, Enforcement Directorate (ED), called for the creation of an
independent prosecuting agency and a high-powered nodal agency to co-ordinate
action in cases where a politico-bureaucrat-criminal nexus became apparent.
These steps thus mandated a complete overhaul of the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases involving holders of public office.
Addressing the problem
of delays in obtaining sanctions for prosecuting public servants in corruption
cases, Vineet Narain also set down a time limit of three months for
grant of such sanction. This directive was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Subramanium
Swamy v. Manmohan Singh,where
the Court went on to suggest the restructuring of Section 19 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act such that sanction for prosecution will be deemed to
have been granted by the concerned authority at the expiry of the extended time
limit of four months. In these and other cases, the Supreme Court has
attempted to facilitate the prosecution of criminal activity, specifically
corruption, in the sphere of governance.
The
Supreme Court, through its interpretation of statutory provisions connected
with elections as well as creative use of its power to enforce fundamental
rights, has made great strides towards ensuring a cleaner polity, setting up
significant barriers to entry to public office for criminal elements as well as
instituting workable mechanisms to remove them from office if they are already
in power. The Commission appreciates that these decisions demonstrate the need
for the law itself to be reformed on a dynamic basis taking cognizance of
latest developments. The same view is echoed by the several committees and
commissions in the past which have recommended fundamental changes to laws
governing electoral practices and disqualifications.
. Association for Democratic Reforms, ‘Press
Release - Ten Years of Election Watch: Comprehensive Reports on Elections,
Crime and Money’ (2013) 1,
<http://adrindia.org/sites/default/files/Press%20Note%20-%20Ten%20Years%20of%20Elections,%20Crime%20and%20Money_0.pdf>
accessed 14 January, 2014
TrilochanSastry, ‘Towards Decriminalisation
of Elections and Politics’, Economic & Political Weekly, 4 January,
2014.