The Supreme Court has said the Enforcement
Directorate and its director may provide instructions related to the facts of a
money laundering case but they cannot direct their prosecutors on how to
conduct themselves in court.
The top court ruling underscored the independence of
public prosecutors as officers of the court and limits the influence of investigative
agencies in judicial proceedings.
The observations were made in an order by a bench of
Justices Abhay Oka and Augustine George Masih on Wednesday while granting bail
to Zeeshan Haider and Daud Nasir, who were arrested in connection with the
Delhi Waqf Board money laundering case.
The bench took note of their prolonged incarceration
and believed that the trial would not begin in the near future.
The bench clarified the limits of the ED's authority
over public prosecutors while addressing a trial court's directive that the
director of the anti-money laundering probe agency issue instructions to
prosecutors not to oppose bail applications in cases where trial delays were
caused by the agency.
We may also note here that the Enforcement
Directorate and its director can give instructions to public prosecutors on
facts of the case. However, the Enforcement Directorate or its director cannot
give any instructions to the public prosecutor about what he ought to do before
the court as an officer of the court, the bench said.
The bench said the trial court order should not
restrict public prosecutors from opposing bail in situations where trial delays
are not the fault of the ED.
This observation will not prevent public prosecutors
from opposing a bail petition on the grounds that acts or omissions on the part
of the Enforcement Directorate are not responsible for the delay of trial, it
said.
The trial court had earlier criticised the ED for
causing delays in the trial while granting bail to another accused, Kausar Imam
Siddiqui, in the same case.
Justice Oka described the trial court's earlier
directive to the ED's director as drastic but acknowledged that public
prosecutors must act fairly and transparently.
It is well settled that the public prosecutor has to
be fair. If a case is covered by a binding precedent, it is his duty to point
out the same to the court. Perhaps the learned special judge intended to say
that when the public prosecutor is satisfied that the trial has been delayed on
account of default or conduct on the part of the Enforcement Directorate, the
public prosecutor should take a fair stand, the bench said.