It stands completely justified and so also is entirely in order that the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Chand Miyan vs State (NCT of Delhi) in CRL.A. 98/2025 & CRL.M.(Bail) 184/2025 (seeking suspension of sentence) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:8508 that was pronounced as recently as on 23.09.2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the courts are under a solemn duty to reaffirm society’s commitment that sexual crimes against children will be met with stern consequences. It must be noted that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjeev Narula made the key observation while rejecting the appeal that had been filed by a man convicted of rape of his eight-year-old neighbour. Very rightly so!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjeev Narula sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present appeal under Section 415(2) read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) (erstwhile Section 374(2) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“Cr.P.C.]) is directed against judgment of conviction dated 07th September, 2024 and order on sentence dated 06th November, 2024 passed by the ASJ-05 (POCSO) North-West, Delhi in SC No. 288/2018 titled “State v. Chand Miyan”. The said proceedings emanate from FIR No. 147/2018, registered at P.S. Alipur for the offences under Sections 342, 366(A) and 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2010 (“POCSO”).”

To put things in perspective and stated briefly, the Bench while elaborating on the factual background envisages in para 2 that, “The case of the Prosecution, in brief, is as follows:

2.1. On 1st April, 2018, a complaint was lodged by the Prosecutrix, alleging that on the said day, at approximately 1:00 P.M., while she had gone to purchase daal, she was accosted by the Appellant, Chand Miya, who was her neighbour and engaged in kabaddi kaam (scrap dealing). He forcibly grabbed her and took her to a nearby godown. It is further alleged that he shut the door, forcibly grabbed the Prosecutrix and covered her mouth. He then removed his own lower garments as well as those of the Prosecutrix, made her lie face down on the floor, and attempted anal penetration, and everything got wet. The Prosecutrix attempted to flee; however, she was unable to do so as the Appellant had latched the door of the godown. Thereafter, the Appellant allegedly handed her a sum of ?10. The Prosecutrix rushed home and narrated the incident to her mother, who informed the police, leading to the registration of the FIR.

2.2. The Prosecutrix was taken to BSA Hospital, where her medical examination was conducted, and findings recorded vide MLC No. 749/2018. During examination, she reiterated her allegations. The MLC mentions mild redness on the labia majora and minora, with the hymen found intact. No redness or tear was observed in the perineal region.

2.3. During investigation, the statement of the Prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded. She stated that the Appellant had taken her to the godown, bolted the door, removed her lower garments as well as his own, and committed anal penetration. She added that immediately thereafter, when the Appellant released her, she managed to unbolt the door by removing a brick and ran to her mother. Her mother thereafter went to confront the Appellant but he had absconded by then. She also clarified that there was no bleeding and that although she was not otherwise assaulted, she had sustained bruises in the assault.

2.4. Upon conclusion of investigation, chargesheet was filed before the concerned Court. Thereafter, vide order on charge dated 18th July, 2018, charges were framed against the Appellant under Sections 363/342/376(2) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

2.7. Upon determination of the age of the Prosecutrix, the depositions of witnesses, and the medical evidence brought on record, the Trial Court held that the Prosecution had succeeded in proving their case. By judgment dated 7th September, 2024, the Appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363/342/376(2) of the IPC. By the order on sentence dated 6th November, 2024, he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 years for the offence under Section 363 IPC, along with a fine of Rs 500/-, and default sentence of 15 days; simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months under Section 342 IPC, along with a fine of Rs 500/-, and default sentence of 15 days; and rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years under Section 376(2) IPC, along with a fine of Rs 1,000/-, and default sentence of 30 days. The said sentences were directed to run concurrently, and benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C was granted to the Appellant. The order on sentence also clarified that the Appellant has not been convicted separately for the offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act, in view of Section 42 of the POCSO Act and Section 71 of IPC. Further, apart from the sentence, compensation was also awarded to the Prosecutrix.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 14 that, “The defence has sought to capitalise on two variations: first, that the complaint and the MLC history describe only an “attempt” at insertion, whereas the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and deposition speak of actual anal penetration; and second, that the MLC history refers to “vagina and anus,” while the complaint and subsequent accounts specify the anus alone. These differences are not material. The first account of a traumatised child cannot be expected to provide a precise, clinical description of penetration; it is well recognised that clarity often emerges when the victim is questioned in a more secure setting such as before a Magistrate or in court. What is critical is that in her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and her deposition, the Prosecutrix consistently affirmed anal penetration.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 15 noting that, “As per Section 3 of the POCSO Act, even the slightest penetration of the anus amounts to penetrative sexual assault, and the law does not require visible injury to corroborate the fact of penetration. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against elevating peripheral discrepancies into determinative contradictions when the core account of sexual assault remains intact and credible. (State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar, (2017) 2 SCC 51). In law, the testimony of a survivor of sexual assault, if credible, requires no mechanical corroboration and can form the sole basis of conviction. The Supreme Court has underscored this principle in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 when characterising a “sterling witness”.”

Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 16 that, “It must also be noted that the phrase “everything became wet,” (“phir sab geela-geela ho gaya”, as reported in her complaint as well as her testimony before the Court.) recurring in both the complaint and the deposition, cannot be read as embellishment. It reflects, in the vocabulary of a child, the physical consequence of the act she endured. When viewed alongside her account of forced undressing, gagging, and the immediate sensation of pain, (“mujhe bahut dar hua”, as noted in her deposition before the Trial Court.) the expression appears spontaneous and natural rather than contrived. Equally significant is her prompt disclosure of the incident to her mother, without delay or external influence. Such immediacy of the narration instills confidence in its truthfulness and falls within the ambit of res gestae under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.”

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 32 that, “The Appellant, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the allegations in toto and asserted false implication owing to prior animosity. In defence, he examined his brother, DW-1 Salim Mohammad, who deposed that the godown was being used as a residential premises occupied by several individuals, and that the Prosecutrix’s mother had falsely implicated the Appellant to conceal her prior association with him.”

Most rationally, the Bench points out in para 33 that, “This line of defence does not assist the Appellant. The allegation of prior enmity or personal animus is wholly unsubstantiated. No independent evidence was led to suggest any dispute proximate to the incident that could plausibly explain a child’s false accusation of such gravity. While false implication is not impossible in sexual offence cases, the burden lies on the defence to establish some credible foundation for such a theory. None is forthcoming here. The improbability of a minor voluntarily subjecting herself to medical examination, prolonged investigation, and cross-examination without any apparent motive is a factor the Court cannot overlook.”

To be sure, the Bench observes in para 34 that, “Second, the testimony of DW-1 lacks probative weight. Being the Appellant’s brother, his evidence is inherently interested, and his suggestion that the Prosecutrix was prompted to make allegations in order to conceal her mother’s supposed relationship with the Appellant is not only speculative but implausible. The Trial Court rightly discounted this testimony, and there is no material to warrant a different view.”

It merits noting that the Bench notes in para 35 that, “Third, the absence of a site plan or statements from independent shopkeepers in the vicinity does not, by itself, create a reasonable doubt. It is well settled that sexual offences frequently occur in private or secluded locations and are rarely witnessed by outsiders. The consistent account of the Prosecutrix, corroborated by her mother, medical examination, and DNA evidence, is more than sufficient to establish the foundation of the offence.”

It also must be taken into account that the Bench then notes in para 36 that, “As to chain of custody and the Defence suggestion of a 15-day delay in dispatch to FSL: the record does not reveal any tampering or breach, and the seals were not shown to be compromised. The expert from FSL confirmed receipt of the exhibits in sealed condition, with the seals tallying with the specimen impressions. Further, the defence did not extract in cross-examination any admission to suggest breach of the chain of custody. In these circumstances, the timing of dispatch, by itself, does not diminish the probative force of the semen detection and DNA match, which strongly corroborate the Prosecutrix’s testimony.”

Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 37 that, “As regards the Appellant’s contention concerning the alleged lapse on the part of the Investigating Agency in not associating independent witnesses with the investigation or examining nearby shopkeepers, it is noted that the Investigating Officer (PW-14), in her cross-examination, stated that no worker was present inside the godown at the time when she visited the scene of the incident. She further deposed that, although efforts were made to associate public witnesses from the vicinity of the godown, the same could not materialise as no one was found to be available. In any event, given the consistent and cogent testimony of the Prosecutrix regarding the incident of sexual assault, such alleged investigative lapses do not, by themselves, vitiate the Prosecution’s case. It is well-settled that the case of the Prosecution cannot be discarded solely on the ground that no independent witnesses have been examined, especially when the testimony of the victim inspires confidence of the Court. (State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384.).”

Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 38 that, “In these circumstances, the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act stands unrebutted. The Defence has not discharged the burden of creating a preponderance of probabilities consistent with innocence. On the contrary, the record points unerringly to the Appellant’s culpability.”

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 39 that, “The record of this case discloses the ordeal of a child barely eight years of age, who was betrayed and violated by a neighbour she would ordinarily have trusted. Her courage in disclosing the incident to her mother immediately, in narrating the same to the Magistrate, and before the Court, is commendable. The law has long recognised that children, because of their tender age, may not describe such acts with clinical precision; yet the essence of their testimony, if natural and consistent, must be given full weight. Here, her account finds strong corroboration in the scientific evidence, leaving no room for reasonable doubt.”

Most significantly, most forthrightly and so also most remarkably, the Bench then encapsulates in para 40 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Offences of this nature strike at the very core of a child’s dignity and security. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 was enacted to ensure that children are safeguarded against sexual abuse in all its forms, and to mandate a sensitive but firm judicial response. Courts are under a solemn duty not only to do justice in the individual case, but also to reaffirm society’s commitment that such crimes will be met with stern consequences.”

As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 41 that, “In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no infirmity in the conviction of the Appellant under, inter alia, Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2) IPC, nor in the sentence imposed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court are affirmed.”

Further, the Bench then also directs and holds in para 42 that, “The Trial Court has already directed compensation to be paid to the Prosecutrix. The same shall be disbursed, if not already done, in accordance with the provisions of Section 33(8) of the POCSO Act read with the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, so that some measure of rehabilitation is secured for the child.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 43 that, “Disposed of, along with pending application.”

In conclusion, there can be just no gainsaying that there has to be absolute zero tolerance for all heinous crimes against children. It is most refreshing, most reassuring and so also most reinvigorating to see that the Delhi High Court has made it indubitably clear in this leading case that courts are duty-bound to ensure that sexual crimes against children are met with stern consequences. It is high time and Centre needs to amend penal laws yet again and make mandatory life term for those offenders who dare to commit heinous crimes against children so that no one can dare to ever take the dignity and well being of a child for granted! It certainly brooks no more delay any longer!