What also must be certainly borne in mind is that Neha was booked by Lucknow’s Hazratganj police in April under various Sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) over her X posts that after the terror attack in Pahalgam, Modi had come to Bihar to threaten Pakistan so that he can garner votes in the name of nationalism. The Division Bench opined that the Prime Minister’s name was used in a derogatory manner in the posts. It also took into account that Neha has accused BJP of initiating war with Pakistan and sacrificing life of thousands of soldiers for its vested interests which is undoubtedly a very serious charge without any prima facie reason to back it. Thus, the Division Bench deemed it fit to dismiss the petition of Neha seeking quashing of the FIR. Very rightly so!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Hon’ble Mr Justice Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Heard Sri Kamal Kishore Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri (Dr.) V. K. Singh, learned Government Advocate assisted by Sri S. N. Tilhari, learned AGA and Sri Vipul Kumar Singh, learned State counsel for the State and perused the record.”

As we see, the Division Bench then while laying bare the purpose of the petition observes in para 2 that, “By means of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:

“(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the impugned First Information Report dated 27.04.2025, lodged by opp-party no.2 at Police Station Hazratganj, District Lucknow, registered as Case Crime No.0111 of 2025, under Sections 196(1)(a), 196(1)(b), 197(1)(a), 197(1)(b), 197(1)(c), 197(1)(d), 353(1)(c), 353(2), 302, 152 of BNS, 2023 and 69a of the IT Act, 2008, as contained in Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition.

(ii). issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the opp party no.3, not to arrest, humiliate, harass, and victimize the petitioners, on the basis of the impugned First Information Report dated 27.04.2025, registered as Case Crime No.0111 of 2025, under Section 196(1)(a), 196(1)(b), 197(1)(a), 197(1)(b), 197(1)(c), 197(1)(d), 353(1)(c), 353(2), 302, 152 of BNS, 2023 and 69a of the IT Act, 2008, at Police Station Hazratganj, District Lucknow, as contained in Annexure no.1.”

Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 20 that, “Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that although Article 19 of the Constitution of India gives all citizens the rights regarding freedom of speech and expression but subject to reasonable restrictions for preserving inter-alia public order, decency or morality. It is trite in law that the extent of protection of speech and expression would depend on whether such speech and expression would constitute a propagation of ideas or would have any social value. If the answer to the said question is in affirmative, such speech would be protected under Article 19 (1) (a); if the answer is in negative, such speech and expression would not be protected under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India.”

It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench candidly concedes in para 21 observing that, “After perusing the allegations of the FIR and the relevant portion of the case diary, we are convinced that the allegations in the First Information Report and other material, prima facie, disclose cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by the police officers.”

While citing the relevant and renowned case laws, the Division Bench underscores in para 22 propounding clearly that, “The law is trite on the point as stated above that the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) is not an absolute right but the aforesaid right shall be considered subject to the reasonable restrictions in the light of Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in re; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955, has observed that the State can impose restrictions to prevent speech that incites violence or undermines national unity or disrupts public order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in re; Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Others, 1966 AIR 740, has upheld restrictions on publications containing prejudicial reports that could endanger public safety. It has been the consistent view of the Constitutional Courts that the restrictions may be imposed to prevent speech that incites violence, riots or public disorder. The Apex Court upheld the restrictions on publications promoting hatred and violence between communities.”

As a corollary, the Division Bench then holds unequivocally in para 23 that, “In view of the facts, circumstances and reasons as well as the case laws so cited by the learned counsel for the parties, as considered above, since the allegations of the FIR and other material disclose, prima facie, cognizable offence, justifying investigation by the police officers, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned FIR.”

Adding more to it, the Division Bench then hastens to add in para 24 observing that, “Further, the present case so placed and argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not qualify the touchstone of the guidelines so formulated by the Apex Court in re; Bhajan Lal (supra). We are in respectful agreement with the judgement of the Apex Court in re; Bhajan Lal (supra).”

Most significantly, most rationally and so also most forthrightly, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 25 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The judgment so cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not be applicable in the present case inasmuch as in re; Imran Pratapgadhi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court after perusing the relevant extract of the poetry has observed in para-12 that the poem does not refer to any religion, caste or language and it does not refer to any persons belonging to any religion, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, does it promote enmity between different groups whereas in the present case, timings of the tweets of the petitioner are so crucial and worth considering inasmuch as the aforesaid tweets have been circulated immediately after the unfortunate incident dated 22.04.2025 at Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir. The case diary as placed before us shows that there are so many tweets but some of them have been reproduced in this order that goes to show that the posts written by the petitioner are against the Prime Minister of India and Home Minister of India. Name of the Prime Minister of India has been used in a derogatory and disrespectful manner. In such comments, the petitioner has used religious angle, Bihar election angle accusing the Prime Minister by name and saying that the B.J.P. Government is sacrificing the life of thousands of soldiers for its vested interest pushing the country in a war with a neighbouring country.”

It is worth noting that while displaying pragmatism, the Division Bench then for sake of clarity clarifies in para 26 observing that, “Since the investigation is going on, therefore, we restrain ourselves to comment on the merits of the issue having expectation that fair, independent and impartial investigation is conducted and concluded strictly in accordance with law, without being influenced from any observation made herein above and the same may not affect the investigation in any manner whatsoever.”

Resultantly, the Division Bench then directs and holds in para 27 that, “In view of what has been considered herein above, this writ petition is dismissed being misconceived.”

Finally, the Division Bench then directs and concludes by holding in para 28 that, “The petitioner is directed to participate in the investigation, which is pending pursuant to the impugned FIR, and she shall appear before the Investigating Officer on 26.09.2025 at 11.00 a.m. sharp to cooperate in the investigation and shall further cooperate in the investigation till filing of police report.”

In conclusion, this leading judgment by the Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Hon’ble Mr Justice Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court is a clear, loud and sharp message to one and all that using PM’s name in a derogatory manner will be taken most seriously and in flagrant violation of law. It has also made it indubitably clear that those who dare to still unscrupulously indulge in it will have to face the legal consequences for it as we see in this leading case also! No denying or disputing it!