It is most vital to note that while striking the right chord in taking a significant giant step forward, the Telangana High Court at Hyderabad in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud v. State of Telangana in Criminal Petition Nos. 4905, 4903 & 8416 of 2025 that was pronounced as recently as on 10.09.2025 has laid down key guidelines for the police and Trial Courts to adhere to and follow when handling criminal cases that have been filed for social media posts on politics and political figures/leaders to ensure that such comments are not unduly criminalized in future which also constitute the backbone of this leading judgment and deserve to be implemented most strictly and in totality. It must be also mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice N Tukaramji passed the order while quashing three criminal cases that had been filed against the account holder of X (formerly Twitter) handle @Nallabalu over tweets that criticized the Chief Minister A Revanth Reddy-led Congress government in Telangana. It must be noted that the Bench found that the tweets, though critical, fall squarely within the ambit of legitimate political expression.

We need to note that these most commendable guidelines were issued after the Bench noted that in the present case, defamation proceedings were allowed to be initiated based on complaints by third parties, not the aggrieved person. This undoubtedly violated the fundamental requirements laid down in the procedural criminal law, namely the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), when it came to the prosecution of a person for defamation. It further also found that the mechanical registration of FIRs in this case, without any preliminary inquiry, violated the Supreme Court’s binding judgment in the Lalita Kumari case. No denying it!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice N Tukaramji of the Telangana High Court at Hyderabad sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2  that, “As the crimes are arising out of similar factual matrix and the petitioner/accused is alleged to have committed the offences within the scope of self same sections of prosecution, these matters were heard together and are being adjudicated in this common order.”  

As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 3 revealing that, “Criminal Petition No. 4905 of 2025 has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘the BNSS’) seeking quashment of the proceedings in FIR No. 8 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Ramagundam, Telangana Cyber Security Bureau (“TSCSB”) against the petitioner/accused.

Pursuant to a report lodged by Respondent No. 2, the said police station registered a case alleging commission of offences under Sections 192, 353(1)(b), 352, and 356 read with Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008 (“ITA, 2008”). The allegation is that the petitioner, using the Twitter handle @Nallabalu, posted a tweet criticising the Congress Party in the following terms:

“Congress is the scourge of the state! If the field is affected by the pest, the people will be disturbed.””

Further, the Bench then reveals in para 4 stating that, “Criminal Petition No. 4903 of 2025 is likewise filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 seeking quashment of the proceedings in FIR No. 13 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Karimnagar, TSCSB, against the petitioner/accused. On the basis of a report by Respondent No. 2, the police registered a case for offences punishable under Sections 192, 353(1)(b), 352, and 356 read with Section 61(2) of BNS, along with Section 67 of ITA, 2008. It is alleged that the petitioner posted on Twitter a photograph of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Telangana with the caption:

“No Vision, No Mission, Only 20% Commission! This is how the 15-month rule of the Revanth Reddy led Congress Government is in Telangana.”

The complainant, a police constable, alleges that this post was intended to provoke public unrest, defame the Chief Minister, and disturb public tranquility.”

Furthermore, the Bench then lays bare in para 5 disclosing that, “Criminal Petition No. 8416 of 2025 has also been filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, seeking quashment of proceedings in FIR No. 146 of 2025 registered at Police Station, GDK-I Town, Ramagundam, against the petitioner (arrayed as Accused No.2).

On 18.03.2025, Respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint alleging that, on 04.03.2025 and 11.03.2025, while browsing the social media platform “X” (formerly Twitter), he encountered allegedly vulgar and abusive messages posted by two individuals, including the petitioner, targeting the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Telangana. The case has been registered for offences punishable under Sections 352 and 356(2) read with Section 3(5) of BNS.”

It merits mentioning that the Bench observes in para 9 stating that, “The social media posts attributed to the petitioner, which contain the alleged statements, are prima facie evident from the record. At the outset, it is a settled proposition of law that content posted on social media platforms may, in appropriate circumstances, amount to criminal offences such as defamation, hate speech, incitement to violence, public mischief, and other cognizable wrongs. In such cases, prosecution is maintainable under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) (where applicable), and the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act).”

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 10 that, “However, to proceed with prosecution on such imputations, the investigating agency must prima facie find admissible material both the requisite intent (mens rea) and the actual or probable harmful effect (actus reus) of the alleged act. Mere publication of offensive or critical content, without making out a case of an intention to cause the prohibited consequences, is insufficient to proceed with the criminal proceedings. Authentication of the content, proper collection of evidence and positive identification of the person responsible for the posting are essential prerequisites. Courts, in this regard, are duty-bound to adopt a balanced approach safeguarding the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) while ensuring that such freedom does not extend to speech that causes tangible harm, such as misinformation, targeted harassment, or incitement to disorder. Preserving this balance is critical to both democratic discourse and maintenance of public order.”

Do note, the Bench notes in para 11 that, “In the present case, the allegations broadly encompass charges of provocation to commit rioting, fabrication of false evidence, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace, circulation of statements conducing to public mischief, and defamation. The maintainability of prosecution for these offences necessarily depends upon the specific factual context in which the impugned acts occurred.”

Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 12 that, “Acts that amount to intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace, online mischief calculated to promote enmity or violence, and defamatory imputations, if duly established would justify continuation of prosecution. Conversely, where the statutory ingredients of the offence are absent, mere political criticism, however harsh, cannot attract criminal sanction.”

Most significantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 29 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Before parting with this judgment, this Court considers it necessary to make certain observations. Having regard to the factual and legal position discussed herein, and with a view to safeguarding fundamental rights as well as preventing the criminal process from being invoked mechanically or arbitrarily, it is appropriate to prescribe a set of operational guidelines for police authorities and Judicial Magistrates when dealing with proceedings initiated on the basis of social media posts. These directions are particularly relevant in cases where the registration of First Information Reports (FIRs) is sought in connection with such posts. Accordingly, the police authorities are directed to adhere to the following guidelines:

i. Verification of locus standi: Before registering any FIR for alleged defamation or similar offences, the police must verify whether the complainant qualifies as the “person aggrieved” in terms of law. Complaints by unrelated third parties lacking standing are not maintainable, except where the report concerns a cognizable offence.

ii. Preliminary inquiry in cognizable offences: Where a representation/complaint discloses a cognizable offence, the police shall, prior to registration of crime, conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence are, prima facie, made out.

iii. High threshold for media post/speech-related offences: No case alleging promotion of enmity, intentional insult, public mischief, threat to public order, or sedition shall be registered unless there exists prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence, hatred, or public disorder. This threshold must be applied in line with the principles laid down in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769, and Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.

iv. Protection of political speech/post: The police shall not mechanically register cases concerning harsh, offensive, or critical political speech. Only when the speech amounts to incitement to violence or poses an imminent threat to public order may criminal law be invoked. Constitutional protections for free political criticism under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution must be scrupulously enforced.

v. Defamation as a non-cognizable offence: Since defamation is classified as a non-cognizable offence, the police cannot directly register an FIR or crime in such matters. The complainant must be directed to approach the jurisdictional Magistrate. Police action may follow only upon a specific order of the Magistrate under Section 174(2) of the BNSS.

vi. Compliance with arrest guidelines: In all cases, the police shall strictly comply with the principles laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273. Automatic or mechanical arrests are impermissible, and the principle of proportionality in the exercise of criminal process must be observed.

vii. Prior legal scrutiny in sensitive cases: In matters involving political speech/post or other sensitive forms of expression, the police shall obtain prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registering an FIR, to ensure that the proposed action is legally sustainable.

viii. Frivolous or motivated complaints: Where a complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious, or politically motivated, the police shall close the matter under Section 176(1) of the BNSS, citing absence of sufficient grounds for investigation.”

Finally and resultantly, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 30 that, “In light of the above directions, Criminal Petition Nos. 4905, 4903, and 8416 of 2025 are allowed. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner in (i) FIR No. 08 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Ramagundam, Telangana Cyber Security Bureau (TSCSB); (ii) FIR No. 13 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Karimnagar, TSCSB; and (iii) FIR No. 146 of 2025 registered at Police Station, GDK-I Town, Ramagundam, are hereby quashed.”  

Before winding up, we need to take a cursory look on the relevant paras that  have been missed out hereinabove and which are as follows: -

17. Upon review of the impugned social media posts, the legal position is as follows;

The first post, which describes the Congress party as a “scourge” and likens it to a “pest,” is harsh and metaphorical but constitutes political criticism. It does not attract Section 192 of the BNS on promotion of enmity, since it targets a political party and not a protected group. Nor does it fall within Section 352 BNS on intentional insult or Section 353(1)(b) BNS on public mischief, as there is no imminent threat of public disorder. At most, it could amount to defamation under Section 356 read with Section 61(2) BNS; however, statutory exceptions such as truth for public good and fair comment provide strong defences.

18. The second post, which alleges “20% commission” in the rule of the Chief Minister and the ruling Congress party in Telangana, is closer to the domain of defamation as it names both the Chief Minister and the party. A government cannot sue for defamation, as held in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994), but individual ministers and political parties as associations may do so. Even here, statutory defences of truth and fair comment in the public interest remain available. Sections 192, 352, and 353(1)(b) BNS are inapplicable, as the criticism is political, not communal or provocative.

19. The third post, involving vulgar and abusive remarks against the Chief Minister, may at best be construed as defamation. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008, which penalizes obscene material in electronic form, is not applicable, as the remarks, though abusive, are not obscene.

20. Constitutionally, all three posts fall within the protection of Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees freedom of speech and expression. Restrictions under Article 19(2) apply only in narrow circumstances such as defamation, incitement to violence, or imminent threat to public order. The Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989), and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) has consistently affirmed the high level of protection granted to political expression in a democracy.

21. As for procedure, under the BNSS, criminal defamation is punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. Cognizance can only be taken on a complaint filed by the aggrieved person, or in limited cases by a public prosecutor with prior sanction. The complaint is filed before a Magistrate of the First Class, who records statements and issues summons if a prima facie case exists. The trial then proceeds as a summons case, where the accused may rely on the ten statutory exceptions, including truth, fair comment, and privileged communication.

22. In conclusion, the impugned posts do not attract the application of Sections 192, 352, or 353(1)(b) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, nor Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008. At best, they may fall within the limited ambit of defamation under Section 356 read with Section 61(2) BNS. Even in that context, however, the availability of statutory exceptions, such as truth for the public good and fair comment, as well as the robust constitutional safeguards for political expression, provide a strong shield to the petitioner. Consequently, any attempt to prosecute the petitioner under provisions other than defamation would be legally unsustainable. More importantly, the present criminal proceedings were initiated on the basis of police reports filed by third parties, and not through a complaint by the aggrieved person, as mandatorily required under the BNSS framework for prosecuting defamation. In the absence of locus standi of the complainant, the continuation of these proceedings would be not only improper but also untenable in law.

23. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), which permits limitations only in the interests of sovereignty, integrity, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to offence.

24. The penal provisions alleged require specific prima facie material: defamation requires false imputations harming reputation; insult requires grave and sudden provocation; public mischief requires circulation of false or inflammatory material; and Section 67 IT Act applies only to obscene sexual content. Notably, criminal defamation is a non-cognizable offence under CrPC, investigation of which requires a magistrate’s order under Section 155.

25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently clarified the limits of criminal liability for speech:

i. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 held that mere annoyance or offensive remarks are not criminal; only incitement to violence or disorder justifies restriction.

ii. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) SCR Supl. (2) 769 upheld the constitutionality of sedition law but limited its application to speech inciting violence or disorder.

iii. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221 upheld criminal defamation but stressed the requirement of false factual imputations and actual reputational injury, distinguishing it from political criticism.

iv. Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 mandated FIR registration only for cognizable offences; for noncognizable offences such as defamation, preliminary enquiry or judicial sanction is required.

v. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 cautioned against mechanical arrests and stressed proportionality in criminal process.

26. Applying these principles, the impugned tweets, such as “Congress is the scourge…” and “No Vision, No Mission…”, are plainly political criticism and satire, which do not amount to defamation or public mischief and are fully protected by Article 19(1)(a). The third tweet, though allegedly vulgar or abusive towards the Chief Minister, cannot be equated with defamation absent false factual imputations. Since defamation is non-cognizable, the registration of FIRs without compliance with Section 174 BNSS and without a Magistrate’s order is procedurally unsustainable. None of the tweets contain obscenity under Section 67 IT Act, nor do they disclose elements of public mischief (Section 353 BNS) or provocation to riot (Sections 191/192 BNS). Additionally, the mechanical registration of FIRs in this case, without preliminary enquiry, is in violation of the binding dicta in Lalita Kumari (supra).

27. When the factual matrix of the present case is examined in light of the seven illustrative categories laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, it is evident that the proceedings squarely fall within multiple categories warranting quashment. First, under Categories (1) and (2), the allegations in the FIRs, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, save for a tenuous allegation of defamation. Secondly, under Category (3), the uncontroverted allegations on record fail to satisfy the statutory ingredients of the offences invoked, such as provocation to riot, intentional insult, or public mischief. Finally, under Category (5), there exists a clear legal bar to prosecution, inasmuch as the law mandates that criminal defamation proceedings can only be initiated by way of a private complaint by the aggrieved person. In the present case, the FIRs have been registered on the basis of police reports or third-party complaints, which render them procedurally incompetent and legally unsustainable.

28. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned tweets, though critical, fall squarely within the ambit of legitimate political expression. In the absence of statutory ingredients of the alleged offences, the registration of FIRs without requisite enquiry or judicial approval is unsustainable in law, and continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of process. Accordingly, the criminal petitions are liable to be allowed.