Supreme Court very rightly acquits Mother-In-Law in Section 498A IPC Case
By
-- Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate --


It is good to see that in the fitness of things while striking the right chord, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Smt Bhagwati Devi vs State of Uttarakhand in Criminal Appeal No. 2616 of 2014 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 1051 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced as recently as on August 29, 2025 while acquitting the mother-in-law of the deceased woman in a case of dowry harassment that had been registered under Section 498-A of the IPC has minced absolutely just no words to hold plainly that the word spreads faster than the wind about a daughter-in-law being harassed for dowry by the parents-in-law. It must be noted that the appeal before the top court was filed by the woman who had been convicted for the offence that is punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. It merits just no reiteration that the Apex Court very rightly acquitted the mother-in-law after taking into consideration among other things the deposition of the neighbour also thus setting aside the judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court. No denying or disputing it in any way!

 

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Aravind Kumar for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice NV Anjaria sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The Appellant herein who has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC is assailing the judgment rendered by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.174 of 2003 on 10.04.2014.”

 

To put things in perspective, the Bench while elaborating on the facts of the case envisages in para 2 stating that, “The son of the Appellant – Sh. Sanjay Mishra married Smt. Chandra Devi, the daughter of the complainant – Dharmanand Joshi (PW1) according to Hindu customs and rites about a year prior to her death on 15.06.2001. PW-1 presented a complaint before Bagwshwar (P.S.) on 16.06.2001 alleging that his daughter was found dead inside the matrimonial home and only the accused persons were present in the house. It was also stated in the complaint that the daughter of PW-1 had committed suicide by hanging herself. However, he is said to have seen the wounds on his daughter’s body during examination and he along with the Patwari saw blood along with water oozing out from the mouth of his daughter. It was further alleged that she was pregnant at the time of her death and further stated that deceased used to inform that her mother-in-law was commenting on her sarcastically for dowry. Hence, expressing doubt about her death and his daughter having been killed requested suitable action being taken against the culprits. It was also stated by the complainant himself that her husband namely son-in-law was out of city on professional work at Mumbai. The said complaint came to be registered in Crime Case No.1 of 2001 for the offences punishable under Sections 498- A and 304-B of IPC. The father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased were arraigned as accused and the trial court framed the charge for the offences under Sections 304-B, 498-A and optional charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. On behalf of the prosecution, three (3) witnesses namely Dharmanand Joshi, Shambhu Dutt Joshi and Smt. Heera Devi apart from four (4) other witnesses were examined and on behalf of the accused one Smt. Janki Devi was examined. The learned Sessions Judge after trial held that the charge of Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC was not proved against all the accused. So also, for the charge of Section 304-B was held to be not proved and accused persons were acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 304-B of IPC. However, Accused no.2 – Mother-in-law namely the Appellant herein was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC on the ground that deceased had informed her mother (PW-3) and brother (PW-2) about the harassment she was facing for dowry to which effect they had accordingly deposed before the trial court. Hence, the learned Trial Judge concluded that deceased had committed suicide due to harassment. However, the offence under Section 498-A of IPC was held to be not proved against Accused no.1 and Accused no.3 and they came to be acquitted for all the offences alleged.”

 

As it turned out, the Bench then enunciates in para 3 laying bare mentioning that, “The Accused no.2 being aggrieved by the conviction and sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.5,000/- and default sentence of three months imprisonment preferred an appeal before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.174 of 2003. The High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that evidence of PW3 disclosed that on every visit made by the deceased to the paternal home, she had disclosed the demand of dowry by her mother-in-law as well as other accused persons as an acceptable piece of evidence and as such affirmed the judgment of sessions court. Hence, this Appeal.”

 

Do note, the Bench notes in para 6 that, “Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties and on scrutiny of the records of the courts below, it would clearly emerge that though the appellant along with her husband and another son was charged for the offences punishable under Section 304-B and as an alternate under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC they have been acquitted by the court below for which there was no appeal. In other words, the order of acquittal for the said two offences had attained finality.”

 

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench opines in para 8 observing that, “A perusal of Section 498-A would clearly indicate that whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects her to cruelty would be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also liable to fine. Under the caption of explanation “Cruelty” has been defined to mean and include any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the said woman or harassment of the woman or where the harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Demand for dowry in any form is itself sufficient for Section 498-A of IPC being attracted. Demand made in any form either by the husband or by the relative of the husband would also attract Section 498-A of IPC. Even if the demand exhibits the conduct that would likely to drive the said woman being unable to bear such conduct would attract Explanation (a). Likewise, harassing of a married woman with a view to coercing her or her relative to meet any unlawful demand would also fall within the mischief of the expression ‘cruelty’. This court in the case of Manju Ram Kalita vs. State of Assam (2009) 13 SCC 330 has held cruelty for purpose of Section 498-A of IPC is to be established in that context as it may be different from other statutory provisions. In other words, it has been held that it has to be established that the woman had been subjected to cruelty continuously/persistently or at least in close proximity of time of lodging of complaint. It has been further held:-

 

“21. “Cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC is to be established in the context of Section 498-A IPC as it may be different from other statutory provisions. It is to be determined/inferred by considering the conduct of the man, weighing the gravity or seriousness of his acts and to find out as to whether it is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide, etc. It is to be established that the woman has been subjected to cruelty continuously/persistently or at least in close proximity of time of lodging the complaint. Petty quarrels cannot be termed as “cruelty” to attract the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. Causing mental torture to the extent that it becomes unbearable may be termed as cruelty.””

 

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 9 that, “Keeping the aforesaid salutary principles enunciated by this court in mind, while we turn our attention to the facts on hand it would be apt and appropriate to have a look at the complaint lodged by the father of the deceased PW-1 on the very next day of the demise of his daughter. The perusal of the complaint would indicate that the complainant had reached his daughter’s matrimonial home on 16.06.2001 at 4 A.M. and he came to know that his daughter had expired in the afternoon on 15.06.2001 and was informed that she had committed suicide by hanging. It is further stated that the deceased used to tell them during her visit to the paternal home that her mother-in-law used to comment on her sarcastically for dowry. There is not even a word with regard to any dowry demand having been raised by the appellant. In this background when the deposition of the complainant PW-1 is perused it would not detain us for long to arrive at a definite conclusion that his deposition does not indicate of any such demand for dowry having been made or the deceased having been inflicted with cruelty so as to drive her to commit suicide. It would be appropriate to note at this juncture itself that the cause of death has been recorded as asphyxia on account of strangulation as evidenced from the post-mortem report.”

 

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 10 that, “The trial court has based the conviction on the strength of the evidence of the mother of the deceased PW-3. She has deposed that her inlaws used to state that the dowry given was less and she used to weep. In the cross-examination she admits that her daughter had come with her younger brother-in-law and had not made any complaint about the members of the matrimonial home. She also admits that during Shiv Ratri her daughter had come alongwith son-in-law and she did not make any complaint. She further admits that when PW-1 went to drop her to her matrimonial home she did not make any complaint to her father about any demand for dowry being made. She further admits that the alleged demands made by father-in-law, mother-in-law and younger brother-in-law was for the first time disclosed in the court when she tendered her examination-in-chief. She also admits that the married life of her daughter was happy and cordial and at the time of marriage there was no demand for dowry. She infact admits at the time of marriage her son-in-law had told that he has no demand of dowry. A holistic look at the deposition of PW-3 that is the mother of the deceased would not inspire any confidence to any person of common prudence to arrive at a conclusion that on account of either harassment for dowry or on account of demand for dowry made by the appellant she had been perforced to commit suicide. Even the evidence of PW-2 that is the brother of the deceased is in line with the evidence tendered by his mother PW-3. Infact he also admits that there was no demand for dowry made before marriage and the marriage was solemnised happily and properly and only on the basis of doubt he was expressing that his sister might have been murdered. The doctor (PW-4) who conducted the post-mortem and submitted the report (Ex. Ka-2) of the deceased PW-4 has opined the cause of death appears to be asphyxia on account of strangulation. He admits if there is strangulation then possibility of injuries being suffered to other parts of the body is possible and when there is resistance to the strangulation there is likelihood of urination and faecal matter can also be excreted which was not found on the body of the deceased.”

 

Most significantly and resultantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 11 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Thus, the cumulative effect of the evidence of these witnesses would drive us to the irresistible conclusion that the deceased had not committed suicide on account of either demand for dowry being made or cruelty being inflicted on her. Our view also gets fortified by the fact that the neighbour of the appellant who was examined as DW-1 has deposed that appellant had never made any demand for dowry. She also deposed that the deceased had informed her of not keeping well. She being neither the relative of the appellant nor belonging to the same community to which the appellant belongs would indicate that there was no interest in her to depose against the factual matrix or in favour of the appellant. Her evidence having been brushed aside by the trial court and also High Court on the premise that she could not have deposed any fact with regard to the demand of dowry as it happens within the four walls is an erroneous finding particularly in such matters the word spreads faster than the wind about a daughter-in-law being harassed for the dowry by the parents in law. Such facts being conspicuously absent in the instant case, we have no hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 498-A and the sentence imposed on her cannot be sustained.”

 

Finally and as a corollary, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding aptly in para 12 that, “For the reasons afore-stated above, we allow this Appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.174 of 2003 dated 10.04.2014 and acquit the accused for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC. Her bail bonds stand discharged. No order as to costs.”


26 Sep 2025